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Abstract
A current U.S. policy is to introduce a new style of currency that is harder to
counterfeit, but not immediately to withdraw from circulation all of the old-style
currency. This policy is analyzed in a random matching model of money, and its
potential to decrease counterfeiting in the long run is shown. For various
parameters of the model, three types of equilibria are found to occur. In only one
does counterfeiting continue at its initial high level. In the other two, both genuine
and counterfeit old-style money go out of circulation—immediately in one and
gradually in the other. There are objectives and expectations that can reasonably
be imputed to policymakers, under which the policy that they have chosen can
make sense.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Earlier this year, the Federal Reserve System and the U.S.
Treasury introduced $100 bills that are printed in a new
style. These new-style bills are much more difficult and
expensive to counterfeit convincingly than the old-style
bills, and the main reason for introducing them is a desire
todecreasecounterfeiting.TheU.S.governmentisempha-
sizing that old-style bills will still be honored, though.
They are being removed from circulation by a process that
could take years to complete.
1 Superﬁcially, then, it seems
that this policy—introducing new-style bills, but not ag-
gressively withdrawing old-style bills from circulation—
mightnotachieveitsaimofdecreasingcounterfeitinguntil
the last genuine old-style bill is gone. Although we do not
show that the current policy will necessarily be effective in
the near term, we do show that a long-term failure cannot
be taken for granted. Thus, the U.S. policy is not self-de-
feating, as it seems on ﬁrst sight. There are objectives and
expectationsthatcan reasonablybeimputedto policymak-
ers, under which the policy they have chosen can make
sense.
Speciﬁcally, we analyze the effects of the introduction
ofnew-stylemoneyonthecounterfeitingofold-stylemon-
ey in a random matching model, where genuine old-style
money is acceptable as legal tender forever. We ﬁnd that
three types of equilibria exist in this model economy. In
one, counterfeiting persists; in others, counterfeiting stops,
either immediately or after some period of time.
2 We ﬁnd
conditionsunder which the U.S.policy hasthe best chance
to be effective, although we cannot say unconditionally
that the policy will lead to the elimination of counterfeit-
ing. Moreover, we show that even a successful policy may
nothaveanimmediateeffect.Counterfeitmoneymaycon-
tinue to be produced for some time after the policy is intro-
duced, and counterfeit money may be acceptable in trade
forever,eventhoughitwillasymptoticallystopcirculating.
Since counterfeiting persists in some equilibria but not
inothers,whatcanwelearnfromtheequilibriumanalysis?
Actually, welearnthreethings ofinterest.First, aswehave
alreadypointedout,welearnthatanequilibriumdoesexist
in which counterfeiting stops at some date. Thus, the fail-
ure of the U.S. policy is not inevitable. Moreover, the real-
ization that counterfeiting can stop eventually, although it
does not stop immediately, may prevent people from mak-
ing a premature judgment that the introduction of new-
style money has failed to achieve its purpose.
Second, we learn that a necessary condition for the ex-
istence of an equilibrium with persistent counterfeiting is
that the probability of conﬁscation cannot be too high.3 In
other words, an aggressive effort to conﬁscate counterfeit
bills can stop counterfeiting, and such government effort
may be necessary. Thus, the model shows that, at least for
someparametervalues,continuedconﬁscationofold-style
counterfeit is an essential complement to the introduction
of new-style money. However, our analysis also shows
that the level of conﬁscation effort needed to stop counter-
feiting may be lower when new-style money is introduced
concurrently than it would have to be otherwise.
Third, we learn from the model that the introduction of
the new-style money does not necessarily mean that the
old-style money will immediately go out of circulation in
the sense of being refused in transactions. In fact, we show
a case in which the old-style money always remains in cir-
culation in this sense. Thus, the analysis shows that the
old-style money can be withdrawn from circulation on a
smoothtimepath,so thatthequantityofmoneyacceptable
in trade does not decrease abruptly. This is perhaps not
directly relevant to the U.S. domestic economy. However,
the large holdings of U.S. currency in some foreign coun-
tries addsa furtherdimension to the problem.For instance,
a U.S. foreign policy objective is to foster economic stabil-
ity in Russia, where more than a quarter of the real value
of the total currency stock consisted of old-style U.S. $100
bills at the start of 1996.
4 Pulling these bills from circula-
tion abruptly would be an even more extreme monetary
contraction than the severe one that occurred in the United
Statesatthebeginningofthe1930sdepression.Manypoli-
cymakers would worry deeply about the macroeconomic
consequencesofsuchacontraction,especiallyinacountry
where there are already public-ﬁnance difficulties that
would complicate the use of ﬁscal policy to mitigate the
shock. Inview ofsuch concern bypolicymakers, our mod-
el can help explain how the new U.S. currency policy can
have been chosen rationally.
The Environment
To study the new policy, we formulate and analyze a ran-
dom matching model of money, in which agents are ran-
domly matched into pairs and use money to make trades
that would otherwise not be made.
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There are two types of agents. One type is private
agents, or traders, each of whom is able to (costlessly)
produce and store one commodity but wants to consume
only another commodity.
6 We assume that there are T
types of traders, who are indexed by the commodity they
want to consume. Speciﬁcally, a trader of type j wants to
consume only commodity j and can costlessly produce a
unit of type j + 1, which can then be traded for money in
the future. (We adopt the convention that T +1=1 . )
The other type is government agents, who do not con-
sume anything and do not maximize their own utility (or
even have a utility function). Rather, these agents follow a
prescribed rule for replacing genuine old-style money with
new-style money and conﬁscating counterfeit money in a
way more fully described below. The fraction of agents in
the economy who are government agents is S.
The use of money is essential for trade to occur in this
model. Barter is ruled out, because the seller of a com-
modity will never want to consume the speciﬁc commodi-
ty the buyer could provide in return. Our assumption about
storage also makes it infeasible for a trader to carry inven-
toriesofallthe variouscommoditiesthataretraded,so that
only intrinsically worthless (but easily storable and trans-
ferable) ﬁat objects can become universally acceptable in
trade. A seller accepts such objects, which are the monies
in our model, if they can be given in turn to another seller
who offers whatthe current seller desires toconsume. This
trade takes place when the current seller is subsequently
paired with an appropriate trading partner and takes the
role of buyer. We assume that both commodities and mon-
ey objects are indivisible.
In our model, three types of money objects might
serve asﬁat money: genuineold-style money(denoted G);
counterfeit, or bad, old-style money (B); and new-style
money (N). We assume that government agents can iden-
tify all three types with perfect accuracy. Traders can iden-
tify new-style money, but we assume that they are com-
pletely unable to distinguish between genuine and coun-terfeit old-style money when either is presented in trade. If
traders do accept counterfeit money, though, then they are
able to recognize it after making a close inspection. Based
on some news reports, we believe that this assumption ac-
curately reﬂects the predicament of the public in places
like Russia and the Middle East today.
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All agents are inﬁnitely lived, and they are randomly
matched into pairs at each date. Because there are inﬁnite-
ly many agents, no pair ever meets twice. Whenever two
private agents are matched with each other, they must de-
cide whether or not to trade the objects (commodities or
money) they are holding. Trade occurs only if both traders
agree to it. When a trader succeeds in buying a unit of the
desired commodity, that trader enjoys an amount u of
utility from its consumption. Traders each maximize the
expected discounted utility of the random consumption
stream they get from participation in the trading process.
The discount factor is 1/(1+r), corresponding to a real
interest rate of r.
In our model, a trader’s life is basically a repetitive se-
quence of producing a unit of a commodity the trader does
not want to consume, exchanging it for a money object
with someone who does want to consume it, exchanging
the money object for a unit of a commodity that the trader
does want to consume, and then producing another unit of
the ﬁrst commodity as a consequence.
To this description of a trader’s life, we add a descrip-
tion of what happens in meetings with government agents.
Whenever a trader is matched with a government agent
and the trader is holding either genuine or counterfeit old-
stylemoney, thegovernmentagent conﬁscatesit.The gov-
ernment agent then gives a unit of new-style money to a
traderwhowasholdinggenuineold-stylemoney,butgives
nothing to a trader who was holding counterfeit. If a trad-
er’s counterfeit is conﬁscated by a government agent, the
trader can either replace the counterfeit or not. Replace-
ment requires the trader to pay a utility cost c, which is
borne by the trader at the time the counterfeit is conﬁs-
cated. We assume that a trader who chooses not to produce
a new unit of counterfeit can never trade again, because
that trader has neither a commodity nor money. What de-
termines whether or not a trader chooses to produce re-
placement counterfeit after conﬁscation is the essence of
what we study here.
States, Strategies, and Equilibria
As a trader participates in the process of matching and
trading we have just described, that trader goes through a
sequence of states that are deﬁned by what object is being
held. At any time, the trader might be holding that trader’s
produced commodity (state 0), genuine old-style money
(state G), counterfeit money (state B), or new-style money
(state N). The trader might also be holding nothing, if pre-
viously held counterfeit has been conﬁscated and has not
been replaced.
A trader’s exchange strategy at a given time is a pol-
icy that speciﬁes, for each type of object possibly being
held, what other types of objects the trader is willing to
exchange for it. Most importantly, the exchange strategy
speciﬁeswhichtypesofmoneyobjectsthetraderiswilling
to exchange for the produced commodity. (Money objects
are simply old-style and new-style money, since the trader
cannot distinguish between genuine and counterfeit old-
style money.) Let lij = 1 denote that the trader is willing to
move from state i to state j; lij= 0 otherwise. For example,
l01= 1 indicates that a trader is willing to trade a commod-
ity for old-style money, and lG0 = 0 indicates that a trader
is not willing to trade a unit of genuine money for a com-
modity.
Besides having an exchange strategy, at each time, a
trader must have a counterfeiting strategy to determine
whether or not to make a new unit of counterfeit if the
trader is in the situation of holding neither a commodity
normoney. (Presumably,this situationwould becaused by
havinghadcounterfeitconﬁscatedbyagovernmentagent.)
Let g = 1 be a decision by a trader to produce a new unit
of counterfeit after having existing counterfeit conﬁscated
in a meeting with a government agent; g = 0 otherwise. A
trader’s comprehensive strategy is an exchange strategy
and a counterfeiting strategy to be followed by each trader.
A Nash equilibrium is a comprehensive strategy that
each individual trader would adopt if that trader were sure
that every other trader had also adopted it. A steady-state
equilibrium is one in which traders’ strategies do not
change over time. Whenever we refer below to an equilib-
rium of our model, we mean speciﬁcally a steady-state
Nash equilibrium. The way in which we solve for an equi-
librium is shown in Green and Weber 1996.
A Model Without New-Style Money...
As a starting point for our analysis of counterfeiting, con-
sider an economy with only one type of genuine money,
which traders cannot distinguish from counterfeit. Assume
that government agents conﬁscate counterfeit, but that
they do nothing when they meet a trader holding genuine
money. Except for these simpliﬁcations, this economy
works just like the more general one that we mainly in-
tend to study. In particular, traders cannot distinguish gen-
uine money from counterfeit when they make purchases,
and traders whose counterfeit is conﬁscated have to decide
whether or not to replace it.
Since we want to use this simpliﬁed model as a start-
ing point for the analysis of the effects of introducing new-
style money, we will consider only an economy for which
these two conditions are satisﬁed: (1) There is a unique
equilibrium with strictly positive stocks of both genuine
and counterfeit money in which sellers accept money in
exchange for commodities. (2) In this equilibrium, a trader
holding counterfeit always chooses to replace it after con-
ﬁscation. We require this condition in order to have a posi-
tive stock of counterfeit money in existence in the steady
state.
In this economy, the value to a trader of having a unit
of counterfeit, VB, given that money is acceptable in trade,
is
(1) VB ={ ( r + g + b )(r+k)ku –[ ( r + b )(r+k)+r g ] Sc}
÷[ r ( r + g + b + k )(r+k) ]>0
where g, b, and k are the fractions of traders who hold gen-
uine money, counterfeit money, and commodities, respec-
tively, and who are of a given type. The following proposi-
tion, which is proved in Green and Weber 1996, shows
that parameter values exist for which traders will replace
conﬁscated counterfeit in such an economy.
PROPOSITION 1. If(2) VB > c
then a steady-state Nash equilibrium exists with money of-
fered and accepted in trade (l01 = lG0 = lB0 =1 )and with
conﬁscated counterfeit money replaced (g =1 ) .
Given our assumptions about the environment that rule
out barter and that force traders to engage in trade in order
to enjoy any utility, accepting money for one’s produced
commodityistheonlyoptionforparticipationinexchange.
Thus, by itself, the acceptability of money implies no re-
striction on the parameter values for the economy.
In contrast, traders’ willingness to replace conﬁscated
counterfeit is restrictive. It requires condition (2) in Propo-
sition 1 to be satisﬁed. In deciding whether or not to make
a replacement, traders weigh the expected utility from the
consumption they can get with a unit of counterfeit, VB,
againsttheimmediateutilitycost,c,ofmakingthereplace-
ment. The higher c is, the more likely it is that this cost
will be higher than the expected utility and that traders will
choose not to replace the counterfeit. Further, traders’ ex-
pected utility depends negatively on the fraction of agents
in the economy who are government agents, because the
larger S is, the more likely it is that traders will have their
counterfeit conﬁscated before being able to trade it for
commodities. Thus, the higher S is, the less likely it is that
traders will be willing to replace conﬁscated counterfeit.
. . . And With New-Style Money
We now turn to our main model, in which government
agents exchange new-style money for genuine old-style
money in their randomly paired meetings with traders.
Eventually, genuine money will be perfectly distinguish-
able from counterfeit under this scheme, because in the
limit,thestockofgenuinemoneybecomesnew-stylemon-
ey. Here we start from the steady state described in the last
section, in which conﬁscated counterfeit is being replaced,
so that (2) is satisﬁed. We show two possible outcomes,
both of which depend on the parameters of the economy:
eitherthe introductionofnew-style moneywillhavenoef-
fect on counterfeiting or it will lead to the eventual elimi-
nation of counterfeiting.
The following proposition, which is proved in Green
and Weber 1996, shows the conditions under which the in-
troduction of new-style money might not eliminate coun-
terfeiting of old-style money. Let n be the fraction of
agents who hold new-style money and are of a given type.
Since in the steady state, all genuine old-style money will
be replaced by new-style money after its introduction, n =
g.
PROPOSITION 2. If (2) is satisﬁed and
(3) (r+k)ku/[(r+n+k)S]>c
then a steady-state Nash equilibrium exists with both old-
and new-style monies offered and accepted in trade (l01 =
lG0 = lB0 = lN0 =1 )and with counterfeit money replaced
(g = 1), although the equilibrium may not be unique.
This propositionshows that two conditionsmust besat-
isﬁedinorderforcounterfeitingtocontinueafternew-style
money is introduced. Condition (2) is that traders ﬁnd it in
their interest to replace counterfeit after it has been conﬁs-
cated. This condition is satisﬁed after the introduction of
new-style money, because we have assumed that the econ-
omy started from a steady state in which it was.
In order for the introduction of new-style money to
have no effect on counterfeiting, sellers must have an in-
centive to accept counterfeit, even though in the steady
state they know that they are getting counterfeit. Condition
(3) guarantees that this will be true. Why would sellers
knowingly accept counterfeit? Recall that in this economy,
traders only obtain utility if they are able to trade their
commodities for money and then trade money for the
commodities they want to consume. Recall also that wait-
ing for consumption is costly. If there is not much genuine
money in the economy, then a seller would expect to wait
a long time before meeting a trader with a unit of it. In
such a case, a seller might knowingly accept a unit of
counterfeit and accept the possibility of it being conﬁs-
cated, rather than bear the cost of waiting to encounter a
buyer with new-style money. Therefore, the smaller n is,
the more likely it is that condition (3) will be satisﬁed.
Wehavedemonstratedthatundercertainconditions,the
introduction of new-style money may have no effect on
counterfeiting. We now examine cases in which the intro-
duction of new-style money can lead to the elimination of
counterfeiting. One case is that in which traders would not
knowingly accept counterfeit; that is, the parameters of the
economy do not satisfy condition (3). In this case, the in-
troductionofnew-stylemoneymustleadtotheelimination
of counterfeiting in the steady state. Why? Suppose that
conﬁscated counterfeit continues to be replaced as new-
style moneyreplaces genuine old-stylemoney. Eventually,
traders will know that any old-style money being offered
in trade must be counterfeit. Thus, in the steady state, no
old-style money will be accepted in trade, which would
make it worthless. Obviously, utility-maximizing traders
would not pay the cost c to replace something worthless,
so conﬁscated counterfeit would not be replaced, which
contradicts the supposition. Inspection of condition (3)
showsthatthelargerthefractionofgenuineold-stylemon-
ey is when new-style money is introduced, the more likely
this outcome is to occur. (Recall that n = g.) Also more
likely is the possibility that a trader will encounter a gov-
ernment agent and have counterfeit conﬁscated.
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However,theintroductionofnew-stylemoneycouldal-
so lead to the elimination of counterfeiting even if traders
would knowingly accept counterfeit. This is shown in the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. If
(4) VB < c
and
(5) r(r+k)>nS
then a steady-state Nash equilibrium exists with both old-
and new-style monies offered and accepted in trade (l01 =
lG0 = lB0 = lN0 = 1), but without replacement of conﬁs-
cated counterfeit (g = 0).
Condition (4) is that replacing conﬁscated counterfeit
does not pay. Since we started from an economy in which
(2) is satisﬁed, it may seem as if (4) cannot be. That is not
so. If counterfeit is replaced, then VB in the steady state is
given by (1) with bequal to whatever the quantity of coun-terfeit happens to be. However, if counterfeit is not re-
placed, then VB in the steady state is given by (1) with b
equal to zero, since there will be no counterfeit in the
steady state in such a case. Thus, as long as ku >( r + S ) c,
both conditions can be satisﬁed. This is why we said that
the equilibrium in Proposition 2 is not necessarily unique.
Condition(5)isthatasellerwillacceptold-stylemoney
even knowing it is counterfeit. This condition is more like-
ly to be satisﬁed the smaller the stock of new-style money
and the smaller the probability of a seller meeting a gov-
ernment agent (the slower the rate at which old-style mon-
ey is being replaced).
From Propositions 1 and 3, we see that before the intro-
duction of new-style money, the economy could be in a
steady state in which money is used in trade, and even
though the governmentis conﬁscating counterfeit at rate S,
it is being replaced as rapidly as it is conﬁscated. From
Proposition 2, we see that if condition (3) is satisﬁed, the
economy could remain in this steady state after new-style
moneyisintroduced.FromProposition3,however,wesee
that in the same circumstances, the economy can move to
a steady state in which old-style money continues to be ac-
ceptable in trade, but in which counterfeiting no longer
takes place.
If the economy moves to the no-counterfeiting steady
state with old-style money acceptable in trade, will the
transition be immediate, or will it take some time? We are
not able to answer this question analytically, but we have
computed equilibrium paths of the economy for various
parameter values. The details of the simulation are given
in Green and Weber 1996. Here we discuss some features
of a typical simulated equilibrium path, which are shown
in Charts 1–4. The horizontal axis of each chart is time,
which we show for 550 periods.
• The probability that traders are willing to exchange
their produced commodities for old-style money is
one at all times, since we choose the parameter values
such that condition (5) is always satisﬁed. (See Chart
1.)
• The probability that a trader will replace conﬁscated
counterfeit is one until the critical date 426, after
which it is zero. (See Chart 2.)
• Overtime,thestockofcounterfeitremainsconstantat
the initial level until the critical date, since counterfeit
is being replaced until then, but thereafter the stock
falls sharply, because counterfeit is being conﬁscated
without replacement. (See Chart 3.)
• The values of holding counterfeit, VB, and of holding
other (new-style and genuine old-style) monies all
decline after the critical date. The values also decline
from the initial date to the critical date, although the
rate of decline is barely perceptible. (See Chart 4.)
There is, of course, a relationship between the behavior
of VB and the behavior of the time path g. As long as VB is
greater than c, traders will replace conﬁscated counterfeit,
and g= 1. Once VB falls below c, however, traders no long-
er replace conﬁscated counterfeit, and g = 0. In our exam-
ple, this switch occurs at the critical date 426.
This simulation shows that in order for the eventual
elimination of counterfeiting to occur, VB must decline
over time. We can explain, intuitively, why this decline
would occur. Until the critical date, the total money stock
remains constant, because genuine old-style money is be-
ing replaced one-for-one with new-style money, and coun-
terfeit is being replaced whenever it is conﬁscated. How-
ever, the critical date is approaching, so the expected dis-
countedpresentvalueVBweightstheutilityofparticipation
intheeconomyafterthecriticaldatemoreandmoreheavi-
ly. If the utility of participation declines after the critical
date, then the weighting causes it to decline before the crit-
ical date as well. The utility of participation (andhence VB)
does decline after the critical date, because the total money
stock is falling after the critical date due to the nonreplace-
ment of conﬁscated counterfeit. Because of this decline,
the number of traders holding money is decreasing, while
the number of traders holding commodities is not increas-
ingcorrespondingly,becausethetraderswhosufferconﬁs-
cation live in autarky thereafter. (Note that the decline in
the number of money holders due to the falling nominal
stock of counterfeit reﬂects indivisibility.) Therefore, ﬁnd-
ingtradingpartnerstakesprogressivelylonger.Thisdeteri-
oration of the trading environment causes the value of ev-
ery phase of participation in the economy, including the
holding of counterfeit, to decline.
Conclusion
This article is motivated by a desire to understand a new
U.S. policy: the introduction of a new-style $100 bill that
is more difficult to counterfeit along with the lack of any
deadline for private holders to exchange old-style money
for new-style. Superﬁcially, this policy combination seems
to do nothing to decrease the continued counterfeiting of
old-style bills. We ﬁnd that, despite this appearance, the
policy can potentially help to decrease counterfeiting in a
way consistent with foreign policy goals. Three equilib-
ria mightoccurforvariousparametersofthesimplemodel
economy we formulate to analyze the effectiveness of this
policy, but in only the ﬁrst equilibrium does counterfeiting
continue at its initial, high level.
In a second equilibrium, both genuine and counterfeit
old-style money go out of circulation immediately when
new-style money is introduced. This is an equilibrium out-
come essentially because of self-fulﬁlling expectations.
That is, ﬁat money is only accepted if it will subsequently
be accepted by someone else.
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But again, the abrupt transition that would occur in this
second equilibrium might well be a problem for some for-
eign economies where U.S. currency is widely used. From
this perspective, the existence of a third equilibrium—one
inwhichbothgenuineandcounterfeitold-stylemoneydis-
appear gradually from circulation—is especially signiﬁ-
cant. In this equilibrium, counterfeiting eventually stops
because it is unproﬁtable, despite the willingnessof traders
to accept counterfeit.
A noteworthy feature of the third equilibrium is that
counterfeitingmaynotstopimmediatelyaftertheintroduc-
tion of new-style money, even though it does stop at some
later time. In view of this possibility, current U.S. policy
should not be judged a failure too quickly if its initial re-
sults are not dramatic.
The third equilibrium involves an enforcement effort
against counterfeiting in an essential way. In the face of
sufficiently aggressive enforcement, counterfeiting would
stopevenifnew-stylemoneywerenotintroduced.Therel-
evance of introducing new-style money is that it reduces
the level of enforcement required for success.*The authors are also Adjunct Professors of Economics, University of Minnesota.
1Old-style bills are being replaced by new-style bills as they come into the Federal
Reserve Banks for processing, but no deadline for turning in old-style bills is being im-
posed.Sincebetween50and70percentoftheU.S.currencystockisheldabroad,partly
as a long-term store of value rather than as a medium of exchange, some old-style bills
are likely to be outstanding for a long time. (The estimate of 50–70 percent is from
Porter and Judson 1996.)
2For the equilibrium in which counterfeiting stops immediately, see Proposition 3
(speciﬁcally, the discussion of the case when the value of parameter l01 is zero) in
Green and Weber 1996.
3The other necessary conditions are not as interesting, because they concern things
that we assume to be outside the control of the government at the initial date.
4Numerous news reports, such as a July 15, 1995, Los Angeles Times article, sug-
gest that the proportion is at least this high.
5Our analysis of a random matching model follows Kiyotaki and Wright’s (1989)
in its main respects. Kultti (1996) uses such a model independently to address counter-
feiting questions. Our model includes government agents, which are introduced by
Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1995).
6This is a highly stylized assumption. One might try to motivate it by the idea that
a basic commodity such as food both is enjoyed in its own right and is necessary for a
persontobeproductive.However,thisandseveralotherhighlystylizedassumptionsare
clearly hard to view as photographic representations of an actual economy. Rather, one
should think of this sort of model as a kind of science ﬁction world that shares some
salient features with the actual economy and that is simple enough so that the logic of
its equilibrium can be understood explicitly.
7News reports to this effect wereprominent during the months preceding theintro-
ductionofthenewU.S.$100bill.RepresentativeaccountsareGhattas1995andSpecter
1995. A report issued this year by the U.S. General Accounting Office (U.S. Congress
1996, pp. 10, 14) conﬁrms that “Recently, very sophisticated counterfeiters have been
producing very high-quality notes...[that] are difficult for the public to discern....
[M]anyforeignlawenforcementandﬁnancialorganizationofficialshadinconsistentand
incomplete information on how to detect the Superdollar [a particularly high-quality
counterfeitproducedabroad].Thus,ﬁnancialinstitutionsabroadmayberecirculatingthe
Superdollars.”
8In random matching models of money, an equilibrium always exists in which one
or more monies are not acceptable in trade. Here we are asserting something stronger
than that. Not only is there some equilibrium where old-style money is not acceptable
in trade, but when condition (3) is not satisﬁed, all equilibria are characterized by the
nonacceptability of old-style money in trade.
9Self-fulﬁllingexpectationsalsomakeitanequilibriuminthismodelfornew-style
moneynottobeacceptableintrade.Weignorethisequilibriumbecauseitissocounter-
intuitive. Li and Wright (1996) show how the model could be modiﬁed in agreeable
ways that would get rid of the equilibrium.
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Elimination of Counterfeiting Over Time
Four Features of a Simulation Over 550 Periods
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Chart 2 Probability of Replacing
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